Hampton, Mark. Hong Kong and British Culture, 1945–97. Hong Kong University Press, 2024.
香港的回歸，反而為英國提供了一個展示國家成就的機會：包括在香港建立法治、市場經濟以及高效率和無貪腐的政府——這些成就甚至被延伸為整個英國帝國成就的象徵。
The Handover, rather, provided an occasion to reflect upon British accomplishment in establishing markets; rule of law; and effective, corruption-free government: properties that could be extended rhetorically to the entire British Empire.
英國在香港直到 1980 年代初才真正受到挑戰的持續管治，卻為所謂英國的德治提供了一個正面的展示。
Britain’s continuing management of Hong Kong, decisively challenged only in the early 1980s, offered a site in which supposed British virtues could be more positively showcased.
戰後早期曾有這樣的論點：儘管中國可以隨時收回香港，但卻似乎不太會在短期內有此舉動。而這觀點在 1980 年代與 1990 年代也得到迴響：就是雖然中國最終也會收回香港，但出於利益的考慮，中國是不會對香港進行激烈變革的。
[T]he early postwar argument that, although China could reclaim Hong Kong any time it wanted, it was unlikely actually to do so in the near future, was echoed by assertions in the 1980s and 1990s that, although China was, after all, going to reclaim the colony, self-interest would ensure that the Communists did not impose radical change on it.
當時在香港的華人多是抱着過客的心態，他們「反正從未真正地把這個地方當成自己的家，甚至到現在也還未有這個想法，儘管最後會有」，對他們來說，香港有機會回歸中國這件事並不需要特別去關心。
[A]t least for the Chinese in Hong Kong, most of whom were sojourners who had ‘never really regarded the place as their home anyhow and have not quite begun to do so even now, though they will’, the possibility of Hong Kong’s return to China was not particularly arresting.
港英政府雖是對倫敦負責，但實際上卻有越來越多的自主權，並往往會為着地方的利益而犧牲大英本土的利益。
Although responsible to London, in practice the Colonial Government enjoyed increasing autonomy and often pursued local interests even to the detriment of metropolitan British interests.
而不尋常的是，與戰後初期的全球趨勢不同，當時香港政府官方上奉行自由放任的經濟政策，這與第三世界採取的發展主義模式以及西歐的凱恩斯主義混合經濟，形成了鮮明對比。但在實行中香港其實並非是完全的自由市場經濟體系，而是旨在「以最低成本促進貿易和經濟增長」的經濟體系，當需要維護香港及華人精英的利益時，政府會果斷地干預經濟。
Unusually for the early postwar era, Hong Kong officially identified with laissez-faire, standing in sharp contrast with the developmentalist model adopted in the Third World and the Keynesian mixed economies of Western Europe. In reality, Hong Kong was less of a free market economy than one designed to ‘promote trade and economic growth at the lowest possible costs’, and the Government did not hesitate to intervene in the economy when the interests of colonial and Chinese elites required it.
駐軍的真正價值在於其象徵性的意義，就是向中方示意：「直接攻擊將引發一場全面戰爭。」
[I]ts real value followed from what its presence represented, as it conveyed to the Chinese that ‘such an attack would precipitate a full-scale war’.
小冊子也提醒軍事指揮官，必須時刻記住在平息暴亂時，所面對的「不是女王的敵人，而是行為不守法的英聯邦公民。只應使用恢復法律與秩序所需的最低限度武力」。
Yet the Military Commander was called upon to remember that in subduing a riot, he was ‘NOT dealing with the Queen’s enemies, but with citizens of the British Commonwealth who are behaving unlawfully. Only the minimum amount of force necessary to restore law and order will be used.’
FILTH = Failed in London, Try Hongkong
1960 年代中期，對於在洋行工作的外籍人士來說，與亞洲人結婚仍會被視為「不合適」，也「不鼓勵」跨種族婚姻。
In the mid-1960s, for an expatriate working for one of the hongs to marry an Asian was still considered “inappropriate” and mixed marriages were “discouraged”.
儘管承認了華人在現代香港崛起中的作用，但戰後多數英國評論者一致堅持最終應將香港經濟的崛起歸功於英國。
But notwithstanding an admission of the Chinese role in the making of modern Hong Kong, what unites most British commentators during the postwar years is their insistence on ultimate British responsibility for Hong Kong’s economic rise.
香港被想像成為一個以實行「無約束資本主義」為特色的成功例子，是一個互動活力經濟（economic dynamism）的例證——但也有着極端貧富懸殊的現象——正是如果英國欲回歸到凱恩斯主義之前的經濟路線也會面對同樣的問題。
Hong Kong was imagined as a site characterised by ‘unbridled capitalism’, and an example of the economic dynamism – but also the extremes of wealth and poverty – that could also be unleashed in Britain by a return to pre-Keynesian economics.
儘管這種「不受約束的資本主義」論調在一定程度上是一個神話與迷思，但此場景建構着另一個有關的想法：就是英國的自由和英式的優良品質在英國本土中雖被壓制，但在香港卻得以自由地發揮；此外，自 1970 年代中期起，隨着戴卓爾主義對福利國家路線的批評與攻擊日益激烈，香港也經常被引用作為一個具啟發性的典範。
Although this ‘unbridled capitalism’ motif contained its share of myth, it contributed to the idea of Hong Kong as a place in which British qualities and liberties that were stifled in the metropole could be given free rein. Moreover, in the context of the Thatcherite attack on the Welfare State from the mid-1970s onward, Hong Kong was frequently cited as a salutary model.
以上兩種對香港不干預政策相互衝突的評價，顧汝德（Leo Goodstadt）頗為精準地調和了兩者。他認為當時的政府基本上是奉行不干預政策的，但強調此承諾「並非出於原則上的考慮，而是出於政治上的便利和經濟上的權宜」。政府高調地倡導自由放任的理念，用作獲得認受的策略，而採納務實主義也意味着政府無需被理論上的不一致所困擾。與此同時，政府對商業不主動支持，但在社會福利上的開支上也不慷慨，成為一種社會上可接受的妥協，從而維持着香港微妙的政治平衡。
Leo Goodstadt neatly reconciles these two conflicting assessments of Hong Kong’s non-interventionist vision. While accepting the general idea that the Colonial Government pursued non-intervention, he underscores that its commitment to laissez-faire was ‘not a matter of principle but motivated by political convenience and economic expediency’. Championing laissez-faire ideals served as a legitimising tactic, while pragmatism meant that the Government did not need to be bothered by theoretical inconsistencies. At the same time, a general lack of proactive Government support for business was offset by a lack of generous social welfare spending as a compromise that maintained Hong Kong’s delicate political balance.
根據經濟學家熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）的說法，在戰後的英國，創業精神或任何跟勞動無直接關聯的收入都面對着非常不友善的環境，而香港則仍然是工業家、商人和企業家能夠取得成功或遭遇失敗的地方。
While the climate in postwar Britain itself was, according to the economist Joseph Schumpeter, actively hostile to entrepreneurship or any sort of income-earning not directly tied to labour, Hong Kong remained a site in which the industrialists, merchants, and entrepreneurs could succeed – or fail.
香港反而保持了英國經典的特質，而英國本身則不再一樣。
Yet paradoxically, it was Hong Kong that was the more classically British, while Britain itself had changed.
香港的華人有其獨特的人口「歷史結構」，新加坡和澳門的華人是「從家鄉村莊逐漸遷移而來的農民、漁民、工匠或商人後裔」。而不同的是，1950 年代香港的華人則大多是因政治或經濟因素從內地移居到港的新移民。
[T]he work ethic in Hong Kong went beyond any inherent Chinese qualities; these would not explain Hong Kong’s recent economic growth and advantage over the rival ports Singapore and Macau. Rather, Hong Kong’s Chinese population had a distinct ‘historical structure’. Unlike Singapore and Macau, where the Chinese were ‘descendants of settlers who gradually trickled away from their native villages as farmers, fishermen, craftsmen, or merchants’, the Chinese in Hong Kong were, in the 1950s, disproportionately new arrivals fleeing Mao’s China.
有一個說法常常出現於多位小說和非小說作家的論述中，就是管治香港的是滙豐銀行、賽馬會和香港總督。雖然當中排名先後略有不同，但港督總是被排在最後的。賽馬會是社會權力的角逐場所，讓富豪和有關係及影響力的人競爭幹事席位，以自己擁有的馬匹參賽，並在大眾面前公開露面。
A common expression, cited by several writers of both fiction and non-fiction, was that Hong Kong was governed by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the Royal Jockey Club, and the Governor; the order varied but always with the Governor coming last. The Royal Jockey Club was an opportunity for social power, in which the wealthy and connected competed for positions as stewards, raced the horses they owned, and could be seen by the masses.
在韓戰期間美國實施貿易禁運之後，香港積極進軍英國市場，此舉大幅削弱了香港作為轉口港的地位，使其工業經濟擴展。在這個背景下，傾銷指控使香港製造商處於被動的地位，迫使他們在 1950 年代末自願「暫時限制對英國的出口」以示善意，緩解蘭開夏地區的投訴。
Hong Kong’s aggressive pursuit of the British market followed the US-imposed trade embargo during the Korean War, a move that severely curtailed the colony’s position as an entrepot and prompted the expansion of its industrial economy. In this context, accusations of dumping put Hong Kong manufacturers on the defensive, leading them in the late 1950s voluntarily to ‘temporarily restrict exports’ to the UK as an act of goodwill, in order to mollify Lancashire complaints.
對維多利亞式資本主義的支持者來說，英國對戰後香港的管治確保了香港是一塊經濟自由的土壤，使英國人和華人企業家得以在這裏蓬勃地發展，而這是在 1945 年後的英國不能實現的。此地的勞動者既獲致富的盼望所驅動，也能受到貧困威脅的鞭策。而到 1970 年代初，香港更日益成為那些希望削弱英國福利國家的人所引用的一個有力論據。
For its advocates, Hong Kong throughout the postwar years was an arena in which British rule ensured economic freedom so that entrepreneurs, both British and Chinese, could flourish in a way that they could not in post-1945 Britain, and in which workers were driven both by the hope of riches and the fear of penury. By the early 1970s, indeed, Hong Kong was increasingly a cudgel for those who wished to roll back the British Welfare State.
托什在探討 19 世紀末時指出，英國男子氣概的本質是隨着帝國需求的認知而塑造的；而這種男性性別意識根據不同的社會階級，通過公立學校的教育、男孩故事刊物的影響，以及移居的經歷來培養和形成；英帝國所塑造的這種陽剛氣質，包含了「個人財富、無節制的慾望放縱、個人權威和喧鬧的男性友誼」等特點，4 而不少對戰後香港的描述也經常帶有類似的視角：去殖化時代的香港不僅保留了維多利亞式的資本主義模式，使香港在某些方面比英國更具「英國性」，同時也是男性能享受在英國難以擁有的休閒特權的場所。
Writing of the late nineteenth century, Tosh argues that the nature of British masculinity was shaped by the perceived needs of empire, through encounters (depending on social class) with public schools, boys’ story papers, and emigration. Empire, then, shaped a masculinity associated, among other qualities, with ‘personal wealth, unchecked indulgence of the appetites, personal authority and boisterous homosociality’. Postwar Hong Kong was regularly portrayed in similar terms. At the same time that Hong Kong preserved a Victorian model of capitalism, rendering it in some respects more truly British than Britain itself, Hong Kong in the era of decolonisation afforded the masculine leisure perquisites often elusive in the metropole.
一位怡和洋行的高層主管曾將一本名為《香港的藝術與文化生活》的 48 頁小冊子，作為聖誕禮物送給辦公室員工們——不過所有頁面都是空白的。
As an illustration, she tells the story of a Jardines executive giving a forty-eight-page booklet entitled The Artistic and Cultural Life of Hong Kong as a Christmas gift to office staff: all the pages were blank.
就如同在其他被英國管治的地方一樣，也有如戰前的情況，體育運動也為英國人在香港提供了一種在英國海外維繫英國文化的方式。
As in other colonies, and as it had before the war, in Hong Kong sport afforded a means of maintaining British culture abroad.
在維多利亞晚期的倫敦，俱樂部構成了一個純男性的空間，人們加入俱樂部既是出於便利，也是對其社會地位的肯定。倫敦的俱樂部在二戰後才開始允許女性成為正式會員，此時男性已經逐漸從俱樂部的活動轉向其他娛樂場所。24 戰後香港，紳士俱樂部仍保留了許多維多利亞晚期的特色，儘管在有限的情況下，也容許女性進入。
Amy Milne-Smith has noted that in late Victorian London, clubs constituted a male space joined both for convenience and affirmation of status. Only after the Second World War did London’s clubs begin admitting women as full members, even as men increasingly withdrew from clubs in favour of other sites of pleasure. In postwar Hong Kong, gentlemen’s clubs retained much of their late Victorian character, despite the intrusion of women in limited contexts.
根據羅納德·海姆（Ronald Hyam）的說法，「性關係的互動是支撐大英帝國運作和維多利亞時代擴張的重要基礎。」他認為「若非帝國體系提供了各種便利的性機會，在 19 世紀的條件下，對熱帶地區要作出長期的管治根本是不可能的」。他進一步認為，帝國初期對婚姻以外的跨文化性關係（包括雙性戀關係）的開放態度，在 19 世紀末都市「純潔運動」（purity movement）的影響之下，逐漸被改變；而到了 1920 年代，「孟買、新加坡和香港的紅燈區都已經在道德的審視之下。」不過，即使英殖民主義中這種兩性關係的表達，已經變得必須更為謹慎；但是從觀察香港的經驗所得，帝國與性的關係依然是顯著地存在的。可以說，如同英帝國在 19 世紀的時候一樣，20 世紀末的香港，尤其是對男性而言，提供了一些在英國不易獲得的性機會。
According to Ronald Hyam, ‘sexual dynamics crucially underpinned the whole operation of British Empire and Victorian expansion’, such that ‘without the easy range of sexual opportunities which imperial systems provided, the long-term administration of tropical territories, in nineteenth-century conditions, might well have been impossible’... Yet if British colonial sexuality had to become more discreet in its expression, the experience of Hong Kong suggests that the relationship between Empire and sexuality remained prominent. It is not too much to argue that, as in the nineteenth century Empire, in late twentieth-century Hong Kong sexual opportunities beckoned that would not have been as readily available in Britain, at least for men.
香港被視為男性的獵豔之都，特別是英國男性征服亞洲女性的場所，這個觀念建基於其作為一個心照不宣卻又不能明言的公開祕密。一方面，相關的評論與描述簡直是俯拾皆是，多得叫人沒法對其普遍性視而不見，而在當時許多的文本中，這幾乎被看為英人（男性）身分的一項特權。但另一方面，至少在許多上流社會的圈子中，這類行為則被認為是低俗、不光彩和不體面的，甚至會妨礙事業的發展；因此在可享受跟亞洲女性的風流之際，也得非常謹慎和保持低調。奧馬尼的觀察，雖然不限於英國男性，但在此處仍頗為相關。
The idea of Hong Kong as a man’s sexual playground, specifically as a site for the British man’s conquest of Asian women, rested on a measure of knowingness and secrecy. On the one hand, it was commented on far too often for anyone to have illusions about its prevalence, and in many of the period’s texts it was presented virtually as one of the perks of (male) Britishness. On the other hand, at least in many elevated circles, it was regarded as seedy, an affront to respectability and an obstacle to career success, so that enjoying sexual access to Asian women required discretion. F. D. Ommanney’s observation, although not limited to British men, is relevant here.
香港情慾淫靡的形象不僅為那些曾逗留香港的人所熟知，也成了以英語讀者為對象的刻劃和描繪的典型題材，不過，當中的論述多帶着強烈的男性視角，也不帶任何的批評性，並且極少見到對歐洲女性在情慾上的相對刻劃，對那些低調地享受亞洲情婦和妓女的男性也罕見有公開的批評。
The trope of Hong Kong’s sexual decadence was not only familiar to those who spent time in Hong Kong; it also emerged as a stock theme in depictions aimed at a British readership. Moreover, the discourse is overwhelmingly masculinist and uncritical. European female sexuality hardly surfaces in depictions of Hong Kong, while overt criticism of men who discreetly enjoyed Asian mistresses and prostitutes is equally rare.
香港政府於英國同性戀非刑事化接近 25 年之後，仍然繼續對同性戀行為作出起訴，顯然是為了代表當時香港的民意；而這點也是頗為重要的，因為長期以來，英式的殖民管治強調尊重當地文化，除非那些習俗或文化對英國道德標準來說有很大的冒犯性。而自 1967 年以來，政府為縮小與公眾之間的「鴻溝」做着不少的努力，故此在非刑事化的問題上也不欲超於民意之上。
In continuing to prosecute homosexuality nearly a quarter of a century after it had been decriminalised in the UK, the Hong Kong Government was clearly representing Hong Kong’s popular opinion, a point of some importance; longstanding colonial governance emphasised respecting local cultural norms unless they were especially offensive to British morality, while the Government’s post-1967 efforts to close the ‘gap’ between itself and the public militated against running too far ahead of public opinion on decriminalisation.
不少類似的描述對於香港奇跡般的轉型，都會認為是由於英式良好（簡約）治理跟華人的勤奮及創業精神巧妙結合而產生的。
Similar depictions of Hong Kong’s wondrous transformation often credited the fortuitous combination of good (minimalist) British government with the entrepreneurial energies and hard work of the Chinese population […]
香港的「英國性」包含了一種觀念，即自由主義理想下不受政府約束的資本主義。在這種觀念中，個人的成敗浮沉完全取決於自身的努力、能力與運氣。要理解為何頻繁提及並強調這一觀點，必須把香港置於戰後英國福利國家興起的背景之下：香港代表了自由主義的成功，與英國本土福利國家追求「集體幸福和平」（People’s Peace）形成了鮮明的對比；然而，這並非香港「英國性」的唯一層面，與此並存的，還有另一種敘述，即英人看自己作為現代化推動者的形象，為遷移到港的城市人口與偏遠鄉村的原居民帶來了文明的福祉。
Hong Kong Britishness included a libertarian vision of unconstrained capitalism in which one could sink or swim according to one’s own efforts, ability, and luck. The frequent assertion of this vision can only be understood in the context of the emergence of the welfare state in postwar Britain, as a counterpoint to the ‘People’s Peace’. Yet this was not the only dimension of Hong Kong Britishness; alongside it existed a narrative of the British as modernisers, bringing the blessings of civilisation to a migrant urban population and backward rural villagers.
「既然『常規』（私人）住屋與寮屋的居住條件差異如此之小，人們從租金高昂的私人住宅逃往木屋區，實在不足為奇。」而公共房屋政策本身，也進一步加劇了這種理性選擇傾向：相比私人樓宇的住戶，寮屋居民獲得「重新安置」進入公共房屋的機會更大。
‘When the difference between conditions in conventional [private] housing and those of squatter huts is so small, it is no wonder that people are willing to flee from high rents to wooden shacks.’ The rational choice calculation was further skewed by the public housing policies themselves; squatters had a greater chance of being ‘resettled’ into public housing than tenement dwellers did.
當時香港警隊的運作模式結合了都會民用警察的特徵與「愛爾蘭／殖民地」風格的準軍事手法。前者主要應用於維多利亞城（即中環）和九龍，而後者則更常見於新界的鄉郊地區。38 然而，在面對騷亂等極端事件時，這種區分可能會模糊。
According to Georgina Sinclair, Hong Kong’s police force blended characteristics of metropolitan-style civil police practice and Irish/colonial-style paramilitary practice, with the former predominating in Victoria and Kowloon and the latter predominating in the rural areas of the New Territories. In the face of extreme events such as riots, though, the distinction could be blurred.
要在香港推行現代化，等於政府要跟英國長期以來在其他地方的慣常管治手法背道而馳。英國慣常地容許地方精英按當地「傳統」習俗與規條繼續治理，除非這些傳統跟英國文化價值觀有過分至不能容忍的抵觸。
Modernisation efforts required the Government to retreat significantly from the long-established British imperial practice of allowing indigenous elites to continue to rule according to ‘traditional’ laws and customs, except where their offence against British norms was simply too strong to countenance.
這類合作的關係，體現了政府的「積極不干預政策」——就是既會主動地創造在商業上無利可圖、但具有公共價值的項目，同時，也盡可能將政府在香港經濟中的直接角色保持在有限範圍之內。
Such partnerships illustrated the Government’s commitment to ‘positive non-interventionism’ – it acted to create public goods that no business would find profitable to initiate – but also, where possible, to maintaining a limited direct Government role in Hong Kong’s economy.
在還沒有任何有關 1997 年的明確政策或聲明出現前，天水圍（第八個新市鎮）項目和新機場的興建，就是最有力地「用行動說話」的象徵，讓投資者對香港的未來『吃下定心丸』。」
As a 1981 article in the FEER argued... ‘In the absence of any clear policy statement on 1997, Tin Shui Wai [the eighth New Town] and the new airport will be the best “money-where-your-mouth-is” gesture that will allow investors to “put their hearts at ease” over Hongkong’s future.’
這種把焦點從民主制度的本身轉移到「民主生活方式」的論述邏輯，是在戰後時期所常見的。也正是基於這觀點，香港作為一個在威權體制（authoritarian）下的城市，於 1950 年代被宣稱為「中國的「民主櫥窗」（show window for democracy）」。
This shifting of focus from democracy itself to the ‘democratic way of life’ was a familiar rhetorical tactic during the postwar years; it undergirded claims during the 1950s that authoritarian Hong Kong was a ‘Chinese “show window for democracy”’.
在實際管治中，威權總督需要與屬土民眾協商，這一點在新界的情況上尤為明顯，特別是在戰後初期。
The need for an authoritarian Governor to consult with his subjects in practice was perhaps most pronounced in the New Territories, particularly in the earlier part of the postwar period.
事實上，《遠東經濟評論》在 1968 年也認為，宗主國的政治家和官員在討論騷亂後的「香港問題」時，往往將社會改革與憲制改革混為一談；香港的一些評論者亦持類似觀點。30 相較之下，殖民官員則刻意將兩者分開處理。正如美國學者胡素珊指出，1970 年代的社會改革措施並非單純的讓步，而是源於當時的政府逐漸接受了一個現實：香港的人口結構已經改變，而政府的回應卻未能滿足不斷提升的期望——「儘管認知的過程緩慢，且需加上額外五年的敦促」。然而相反地，政府當局並沒有承認政治制度落後，反而更加堅持維護管治權威。
In fact, as the FEER argued in 1968, metropolitan politicians and officials tended to conflate social and constitutional reform in discussing the ‘Hong Kong problem’ following the riots; so did some commentators in Hong Kong. Colonial officials, by contrast, kept the two issues separate. As the American scholar Suzanne Pepper notes, the 1970s social reform measures were not mere concessions; they followed from a gradual acceptance – ‘albeit not without additional prodding throughout five more years of foot-dragging’ – that the Hong Kong population had changed and the Government’s response had not matched rising expectations. By contrast, colonial authorities did not admit to political obsolescence; rather, they doubled down on maintaining colonial authority.
政府將人民視為其家長式統治下的一羣臣民，而非擁有平等政治權利的自主公民。作為臣民，他們的意見是通過諮詢制度傳達給政府的，而諮詢制度的目的則在於盡量減少對其政策的公開不滿。從政府的角度來看，「政治」就是操控公眾的認同並加以展示。而「共識政治」（consensus politics）就是這場遊戲的名稱。
As Ku writes, the government took the people to be a mass of subjects under its paternal rule rather than a public of autonomous citizens with equal political rights. As subjects, their opinions were channeled to the government by means of a system of consultation which aimed at minimizing open dissatisfaction with its policies. From the perspective of the government, politics meant the manipulation and display of public consent. Consensus politics was the name of the game.
危機後的政府試圖透過「聲稱即使沒有民主政體的形式，仍符合民主的價值」的說法，來建立其合法認受性。從政府的角度來看，維持基本的威權結構是至關重要的；而也如前所述，基於種種的原因，認為民主自治是不能被考慮的選項。
Ku’s argument echoes that made by contemporary scholar Ambrose King, who argued in 1975 that the post-crisis Government tried to build legitimacy by ‘claiming to conform to democratic values, if not to a democratic form of government’. From the Government’s perspective, maintaining the colony’s basic authoritarian structure was essential; for reasons already discussed, democratic self-government could not be entertained.
實際上，香港市民並非能夠選擇自己的政府，而是被提供了一種向政府請願的機制；整體而言，這些目標提供了一種將市民與政府聯繫起來的方式，並將他們的地方與社區生活跟政府的中央行政體系掛鉤。
It is instructive that all three of these aims retained the assumption of an appointed, not elected, Government; rather than choosing their Government, Hong Kong people were, in effect, offered a mechanism for petitioning the Government. More broadly, these aims offered a means of attaching people to the Government, and attaching their local and neighbourhood lives to the central administration.
到了 1970 年代中期以後，隨着政府「既無足夠力量，也無足夠意願繼續維持其以往的影響力」，才逐漸出現一個更為積極自主的媒體——會試圖監督政府和追究責任，在實際上扮演着反對黨的角色。然而，即使在這段時期，政府仍會透過較微妙和間接的方式來試圖影響媒體和輿論。
It was only after the mid-1970s, during an era in which the ‘colonial government was neither strong enough nor concerned enough to maintain its previous powers of influence’, that a more assertive press emerged that would seek to hold the Government accountable, acting in effect in place of an opposition party. Yet even then, the Government continued to use more subtle means to attempt to influence the media.
對民主政治的廣泛反感反映了一種共識，就是若沒有威權政府，戰後的繁榮發展根本無法實現。
In Walden’s view, the widespread antipathy to democratic politics reflected a consensus that the growth of prosperity following the Second World War simply would not have been possible without an authoritarian Government.
香港人的「政治本能深植於儒家傳統」，更偏好「威權政府所帶來的安全感，以及通過妥協而非對抗來解決衝突」。
Echoing a theme from his short 1983 book, Excellency, Your Gap Is Showing!, Walden asserted that the ‘political instincts’ of Hong Kong people were ‘deeply rooted in the Confucian tradition’, and favoured the ‘security of authoritarian government and the resolution of conflict by compromise rather than confrontation’.
北京與倫敦在這方面的利益是一致的，但卻與香港人的利益相悖。他認為北京喜歡英國管治的現狀，並且想取得這種「穩定和繁榮」，但「卻未意識到這些現狀也有賴於並存的自由」。而英國則希望在「1997 年前，其管治權威不會遭受任何削弱」。
...Beijing and London had a common interest, one contrary to that of the Hong Kong people: ‘Peking likes what it sees of British colonial rule. It wants to grab that stability and prosperity, not seeing that those things also depend upon freedom. Britain wants no diminution of her colonial authority before 1997.’
彭定康的行事方式可以說是並不誠懇。他明知自己對「選舉」的解讀與北京的立場並非一致，也清楚北京能在 1997 年 6 月之後輕易推翻選舉的結果，故此這樣做最終也可能不會為香港人帶來任何實質的好處。83 然而，他真正所做的，只是為英國塑造一個為香港留下「民主制度遺產」作傳承的形象；甚至如果從更具批判性的角度來看，英國在過去治理香港時，從未推行這些對其管治毫不便利的民主改革；但當香港回歸已經成為定局後，便馬上對維持那套長期以來有利其管治的威權體制不再有任何興趣。
Notwithstanding the Governor’s popularity, John Flowerdew notes that Patten was arguably being disingenuous: he knew that his interpretation of ‘elections’ was not the same as Beijing’s, and that Beijing could easily undo the results of the election after June 1997; he would, then, accomplish nothing practical for the people of Hong Kong. What Patten did do, though, was to promote Britain’s legacy as having left behind a democracy. One could add, cynically, that so long as Britain ruled Hong Kong, it did not introduce inconvenient democratic reforms, but as soon as the Handover was inevitable, it had no interest in maintaining the authoritarian political system that had served it so well for so long.
在《中英聯合聲明》談判前後的氣氛中（尤其是於 1989 年的政治風波後）推行民主改革，可以說既是為了政府能在餘下的管治期間維持香港的可治理性，同時也是為了建構一個得體的遺產。更準確地說，這兩個功能實際上是相互交織的。
In the atmosphere during and after the negotiations leading to the Joint Declaration – and certainly following the events of 4 June 1989 – the introduction of democratic reforms was arguably as much about maintaining Hong Kong’s governability while the Colonial Government remained as it was about constructing a fitting colonial legacy; or, more precisely, these two functions were intertwined.
幾乎沒有任何證據顯示，香港人把「英國性」視為其主觀身分認同的核心。
What I mean, rather, is that little evidence suggests that many Hong Kong Chinese embraced Britishness as a key component of their subjective identities.
如果說英語滲透力有限，那麼英國文化的其他方面亦然，這一點也為不少觀察者所提及。
If the English language had limited penetration, then so, too, did other aspects of British culture, as numerous observers noted.
1964 年，《經濟學人》的一篇文章試圖解釋香港的經濟奇跡，否認香港是「真正的英國殖民地」，並形容香港「是中國的一部分，只不過有英國的殖民管理者、有打字機、法官假髮、燈塔、警察、動物保護協會和配置了 A 鍵的電話亭而已。」
A 1964 Economist article, in the context of trying to explain Hong Kong’s economic miracle, denied that the territory was ‘a British colony at all’; rather, it was ‘just a part of China with British colonial managers, typewriters, judges’ wigs, lighthouses, policemen, animal protection societies and press button A telephone boxes’.
香港華人非但沒有產生自卑感，反而以其民族主義情結而聞名，
Far from developing feelings of inferiority, Chinese in Hong Kong remained famously chauvinistic, a point frequently remarked by western commentators.
英國文化除了在香港實際的日常當中沒有很深的滲透之外，就算是受過良好教育並說英語的華人，也常常會主動否認與英國性有任何的聯繫。
Moreover, beyond a practical lack of British cultural penetration, it was not uncommon for even better educated, English-speaking Chinese actively to repudiate any claim to Britishness.
香港的「協作式殖民權力」並非以分享英國文化價值為主。相反，香港政府所關注的，是一種與向華人社羣傳播不涉及英國價值的治理模式，甚至經常會積極地支持儒家的價值觀，以對抗當時所面對的現代民族主義或跟管治有所衝突的意識形態。
Law Wing Sang has argued that the Hong Kong project of ‘collaborative colonial power’ did not centre on a sharing of British cultural values. Rather, the Hong Kong Government was interested in a governmentality that was unconcerned with spreading British values to the Chinese community, and indeed often gave positive support to Confucian values in opposition to modern Chinese nationalism or communism emanating from mainland China.
但在特定的情況之下，「英國性」對在香港的政治行動主義者來說，是具有工具性的吸引力。
Although Hong Kong’s adoption of cultural Britishness, let alone a subjective identification with Britishness, remained severely limited, in particular contexts Britishness held an instrumental attraction to Hong Kong’s Chinese activists.
BNO 護照未附帶居留權（無論是在香港還是英國），使其作為旅行證件的功能變得相當有限，因為第三國不會允許持有者入境，除非他們能提供可返回某地的證明。至於建議在護照上「註明持有人身份證資料」這點，實際上意味着身份證本身將成為旅行證件。
On the other hand, as the JCWI argued in 1985, the fact that the BNO passport was not attached to the right of abode (in Hong Kong any more than in the UK) rendered the passport fairly ineffective as a travel document, since third countries would not allow entry without proof of the right to return to somewhere. The suggestion that the passport include a ‘reference to the holder’s identity card’ entailed, in effect, that the identity card itself would serve as the travel document.
然而，英國對塑造「香港人」身分的貢獻，遠不止於為這類文化交融創造了結構性的機會場景，還包括具體地編織出香港社會的一些文化觀念與紋理，這種文化影響也經常在香港華人表述的觀點中得以窺見。
Yet the British contribution to the making of the Hong Konger went well beyond merely creating the structure in which such interactions could occur. It also included specific shaping of the cultural fabric of their society, and one that Hong Kong’s Chinese have often asserted.
當代香港華人身分的定義與被英國管治的經驗密不可分，這是一種即使在「殖民者不再明顯存在」的情況下仍然持續的一種「殖民」身分。
In the case of cultural theorist Law Wing Sang, by contrast, the very definition of contemporary Hong Kong Chineseness is bound up with the colonial experience, a colonial identity that continues to ‘linger in the absence of a discernible colonizer’...
而無論政治立場如何，人們普遍認為 1997 年的交接，將標誌着本書此前所描述的香港，就是那個不受約束的資本主義、有序的法治、自由以及現代化的香港——將為不再。
Regardless of their political views, there was a broad agreement that the Handover would mean the end of the Hong Kong that has been described in earlier chapters, the Hong Kong of unrestrained capitalism, orderly law, freedom, and modernisation.
他於 1998 年撰文預測，在大約十年內，香港將被吸納進一個延伸至廣州的「珠江三角洲大都市圈」，當中的特徵包括高犯罪率、「普遍恆常」的貪腐以及「危險」的污染水平。
Writing in 1998, he predicted that within about a decade Hong Kong would become absorbed into a ‘Pearl River delta megalopolis’ stretching as far as Guangzhou, characterised by high crime rates, ‘endemic’ corruption, and ‘dangerous’ levels of pollution.
當然，英國人在香港政權交接後喪失地位的預想，與香港作為一個守法、資本主義和現代化城市在交接後可能終結的預測，兩者在根本性質上是截然不同的。不過，這兩種擔憂在香港的外國人心目中也往往交織在一起，而這一點或許可以從早前提及的羅德威訪談中略見一斑。不過可以肯定的是，無論對香港本身未來的預測如何，到了 1990 年代初期，人們普遍感到英國人在香港的「美好時代」（la belle époque）已經結束。
The vision of the loss of British expatriates’ status in post-Handover Hong Kong is, of course, a fundamentally different matter than whether the Chinese resumption of sovereignty would mean the end of Hong Kong as a lawful, capitalist, modern city – though one suspects that, as suggested in the Gilbert Rodway interview cited above, these two concerns often blended together in the minds of expatriates. Certainly it is worth recognising that, regardless of predictions for the future of Hong Kong itself, there was a sense by the early 1990s that la belle époque was over for British expatriates.
然而，也可以說，香港本身全球性的都市地位，也能算得上是英國所遺留下來的一項持續的影響。根據蓋瑞·馬吉（Gary Magee）和安德魯·湯普森（Andrew Thompson）所述，英帝國在 19 世紀至 20 世紀初，透過英國本身的商業網絡、社會架構、專業系統、人口遷徙以及物質文化來拓展與獲益，從而塑造了一種全球的文化。格雷戈里·巴頓（Gregory Barton）認為，大都會的文化，構成了一個非正式的帝國，同化和吸納了在英國正式殖民地內外的精英階層，而這個非正式「帝國」的影響力，則最終為美國所取代。巴頓認為，這結果「形成了一種單一的世界文化，而這種單一的世界文化是以西方文化主導的」。他指出，這種全球文化的體現，包括技術官僚精英在全球範圍內的主導地位、議會制政府作為普遍的管治理想、混合型市場經濟的廣泛採納，以及西方思維滲透性地對「「全球村」的精神世界」有着殖民式的影響。而儘管在比較具體和特定的細節上能見到一些差異——例如地方語言和飲食文化的不同，但整體而言，把香港置於巴頓所指的「單一世界文化」中，也並不牽強。
Yet one can argue that Hong Kong’s position as a global city is itself an enduring British legacy. Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson have demonstrated that the British Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries facilitated and grew out of British business, social, and professional networks, migrations, and material cultures that collectively helped to fashion a global culture. Gregory Barton argues that metropolitan cultural forms constituted an informal empire that coopted elites both within Britain’s formal Empire and outside it, an ‘empire’ in which British influence was ultimately superseded by American. The result, Barton argues, is that ‘there is one world culture and this one world culture is Western’. He points to the global hegemony of technocratic elites, the widespread ideal of parliamentary government, mixed economies, the colonisation by western images of the ‘mental landscape of nearly the entire global village’. Whatever the more specific variations – local dialects and food cultures, for example – it is not a stretch to locate Hong Kong within Barton’s model of the ‘one world culture’.